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POLICE DISCRETION AND EQUAL PROTECTION*
M. GLENN ABEmNATHYf
It would be tactless and perhaps even hazardous for a
student of police administration to open an interview with
a police chief with a hearty, "Well, Chief, what laws are you
enforcing this week?" The myth of full enforcement has
become so ingrained in our thinking that any implication that
selective enforcement is consciously practiced by the police
is enough to raise the official temperature several degrees.
Yet anyone who stops for a moment to consider the responsi-
bilities and limitations of the administration of the criminal
law realizes that somewhere in the administration of the
police function there must be lodged an authority to decide
where the forces shall be deployed and how rigorously vio-
lators shall be dealt with. In shorthand, this means that the
police have to decide which laws will be enforced and what
exceptions will be made. Thus, while the opening approach
is not recommended, it is surely a question which must be
answered to gain a proper understanding of the actual char-
acter of law enforcement in any particular area. This paper
is an attempt to determine the propriety of allowing to the
police a discretion not to enforce certain laws and to enforce
other laws only partially.
A. V. Dicey understood the rule of law to demand that
the citizen be free from arbitrary power of the government.
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence
of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbi-
trariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary
authority on the part of the government.'
*This article is the text of a paper delivered at the Southern Political
Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November, 1962. I am indebted
to the Summer Research Training Institute in the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice, under the sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council
and especially to the co-directors of the Institute, Professors Frank J.
Remington and Victor G. Rosenblum, for the opportunity to explore some
of the problems discussed in this article.
fAssociate Professor of Political Science University of South Carolina,
B.S. Birmingham-Southern College, M.A. University of Alabama, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin.
1. Dicur, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
p. 202 (9th ed. rev. 1948).
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And, certainly a discretion not to invoke the coercive powers
of government may result in just as much arbitrary power as
discretion to use extra-legal punishment.2 A great deal of
attention has been given to the latter kind of discretion. Con-
cern with excesses of power is readily seen in the tremendous
attention given to police brutality cases. The central thrust
of many of our earlier crime surveys and even the recent
Civil Rights Commission Report on Justice has been in the
direction of pointing up unlawful official violence. Such a
statement is not made with the intention in any way to min-
imize the gravity of those situations. However, it should be
pointed out that under Dicey's "rule of law" standard there
may also be perplexing problems presented in the fact that
even without express statutory authorization, the police have
the authority to decide not to enforce certain laws or not to
enforce them against certain classes of persons. Serious equal
protection questions might be presented by selective invocation
of the law as well as by overzealous enforcement against un-
popular groups.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional an ordinance which made it unlawful to operate
a laundry in other than a brick or stone building without
securing the consent of the board of supervisors. In its ap-
plication the law discriminated against Chinese laundry op-
erators. The Court held that under these circumstances the
equal protection clause was violated.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination
between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is ... within the
prohibition of the Constitution.3
It would seem that the same statement would be applicable
in the circumstances where police arrest all out-of-town traf-
fic violators and purposely fail to arrest local resident vio-
lators, or where certain laws are enforced .against whites
but not against Negroes, or vice versa. Thus far, however,
the courts havenot generally been receptive to equal protection
2. Hargrove, Police Discretion, 25 SOL 337 (1958).
3. 118 U. S. 356, 373, 30 L. Ed. 220, 227 (1886).
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claims cast in this form. (A few exceptions will be noted
later.) In a sense it does seem somewhat anomalous for one
accused of crime to argue that despite the fact that he violated
the law, he cannot be punished unless the police punish all
other violators coming to their attention. To say, however,
that the accused has no complaint if in fact he violated the
law is no consolation to the victim who sees others in similar
circumstances go unpunished. The ready response might be
that the police should not be able to exercise any such dis-
cretion and all would be well. A closer examination of the
problems of the police, however, might lead one to have
serious reservations about so facile a solution. In his intro-
duction to Dicey's work, E. C. S. Wade remarks that "... . suc-
cessful administration depends, not upon the illegal use of
power, but the exercise of discretion by the administrator."
And he quotes another author who states, "It is unfortunate
that Dicey paid no attention to discretions, for it might fairly
be said that they are the most important of all topics for the
modern constitutional lawyer."
'4
There are many stages in the administration of criminal
justice from commission of crime to terminal disposition.
And discretion of one sort or another may be present at each
stage. For the purposes of this paper, only that discretion
exercised by the police will be considered, and within this
segment, the discretion not to invoke the process, or to invoke
it selectively. The questions to be answered are three: (1)
To what extent do the police exercise discretion in enforcing
the law? (2) To what extent should the police have such
discretion? and (3) What kinds of controls can be placed on
discretion which is considered improper?
Bases for Police Discretion
There is, in the minds of many, a sort of myth, model, or
ideal of full enforcement of the criminal law, at least to the
extent that violators can be apprehended. And the official
directives of department, municipality, or state, often make
clear that such is the duty of the policeman. An Oklahoma
City ordinance states that policemen "are authorized and
required to arrest all persons who may be detected violating
any ordinance of the city." And in the introduction to the
4. DIcEy, Supra Note 1 at Lxxvii-lxxix.
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Rules and Regulations of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Depart-
ment, it is stated, "Enforcement of all Criminal Laws and
City Ordinances, is my obligation .... I must be impartial
because the Law surrounds, protects and applies to all alike,
rich and poor, low and high, black and white."5
Despite the exhortations for or belief in full enforcement,
there axe both practical and theoretical limitations upon its
realization. These limitations become the bases for police
decisions not to invoke the process.
1) Budget limitations. - As in any other aspect of adminis-
tration, the allocation of scarce resources requires a policy
decision concerning which laws shall be enforced vigorously
and which in less intense fashion. This is tantamount to saying
that although the policy-maker knows in advance that a
number of violators will go unpunished, he nevertheless con-
sciously sets up his resources to permit such non-enforcement
in order to operate more effectively in coping with other
crimes. This facet of police discretion is pointed up rather
dramatically in a California police training bulletin:
Finally, note must be made of one insurmountable obstacle
to supervisory control which confronts every chief of
police; the fact that it is absolutely impossible to enforce
all laws ....
A study of traffic violations at [one intersection in
Berkeley, California] revealed that if conditions at other
intersections were similar, three million violations of
traffic regulations were occuring daily in Berkeley and
that it would take more than fourteen thousand traffic
officers to enforce the traffic laws in that city.6
Although the necessity for frugality in utilization of men
and time would appear obvious, in 1960 the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas held that selective enforcement of
the Pennslyvania Sunday Blue Law was unconstitutional. The
Philadelphia Police Commissioner, because of lack of funds
and personnel, had adopted, and publicly announced, a policy
5. For a collection of such statutes and directives, see GOLDSTEIN,
POLICE DISCRETION NOT TO INVOKE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, 69 YALE L. J.
543, 558-559 (1960).
6. CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, POLICE SUPERVISORY
CONTROL, CALIFORNIA, POLICE OFFICERS' TRAINING BULL. No. 71, 26-27
(1957), in LAFAVE, POLICE AND NoN-ENFORCEOMENT OF THE LAW, 1962
Wis. L. REV. 104, 114, n. 42.
1962]
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of limiting enforcement of the law to large retail establish-
ments. The court held that such a policy was a denial of
equal protection and enjoined prosecution of a complaining
defendant.7 The United States Supreme Court, however, ex-
pressly recognized the dilemma of the enforcing agency and
approved a similar selective enforcement order of the FTC.
The Commission obtained a cease and desist order against
one firm engaged in illegal price arrangements. The firm
complained that several other business competitors were fol-
lowing the same practices, and that it was unfair to subject
one to serious financial loss without at the same time punish-
ing the others. The Court rejected the argument, and, after
stressing the "specialized experienced judgement" of the Com-
mission, concluded that "the Commission alone is empowered
to develop that enforcement policy best calculated to achieve
the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its avail-
able funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its
policy efficiently and economically.""
2) Priority Schedules of Enforcement. - Related to, although
not identical with, the matter of budget limitations is the
probability of the police chief's establishment of a scheme of
priorities with respect to the criminal laws he is to enforce.
He may set up a conscious policy of attempting full enforce-
ment of certain laws, partial enforcement of others, and vir-
tual non-enforcement of others. Three factors are of im-
portance in the determination of such an arrangement: the
need to stop developments in organized crime, maintenance
of the integrity of and respect for the police force, and the
enforcement demands of community opinion. Thus, all-out
efforts might be made to apprehend syndicate gamblers and
those who attempt to bribe police, while Blue Law offenders
might be allowed to go unmolested. The result is that by
design certain offenders get the full-dress treatment by the
police, while offenders against other laws do not even have
the process invoked against them.
3) The Sub-Legislative Functions of the Police. - It would
seem that one of the most important bases of police discre-
tion, as in other areas of administrative discretion, is the fact
that in enforcing many laws the police are sub-legislators.
Enforcement of a city ordinance requiring new business li-
7. Bargain City v. DiIworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439.
8. Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 US 411, 2 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1958).
[Vol. 14
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censes by July 1st of each year is essentially a straight-for-
ward matter requiring no discretionary interpretation. But
there are other laws which present more formidable problems
of draftsmanship and administration. The anti-gambling stat-
utes are illustrations. In these areas the legislature may well
draw up a broad policy and leave the delineation of detailed
distinctions to the police. This is nothing more than to make
the police a secondary partner in the legislative process. To
speak of administrative action in terms of "rule-making" or
"implementation of legislative policy" is to employ euphem-
isms to cover up the ba-sie-reality that the legislative process
is more often than not a multi-stage process with administra-
tors as key participants. It seems that it is impossible to
draft an anti-gambling statute which will clearly prohibit
organized commercial gambling and, at the same time, exempt
from prosecution participants in a friendly Saturday night
poker game or those who match for coffee at the corner drug
store. The customary answer to the problem is for the legis-
lature to adopt a broad prohibition against gambling and
leave to the expert-the policeman--discretion in applying
the law. He is expected to make the classifications which the
legislature would like to make but cannot, for fear of leaving
loopholes through which the commercial gambler could escape.
The broad power in the police to make such classifications is
clearly legislative in character, whatever term may be em-
ployed to describe it. 9 It is true that a refurbishing of the
criminal codes could remove many ambiguities and define
certain crimes with mo-reprecision, and to this extent the
discretion of the police would be lessened in interpretation of
the law. But there would still remain many broadly formu-
lated statutes which would rest on discretionary classifications
by the police.1 0
4) Individualized treatment of offenders "in the public in-
terest." - The police on occasion will refuse to press an
action simply on the grounds that the public interest doesn't,
or shouldn't, demand penalties. This kind of discretion is
9. "It may help'clarify the proper administrative function . . . to
think of the legislation as unfinished law which the administrative body
must complete before it is ready for application. In a very real sense
the legislature does not bring to a close the making of the law." JAFFE,
ADTIINISTRATE LAw, 474-475 (1955).
10. For an excellent treatment of the problems facing the legislature
in this area, see REMINGTON and ROSENBLUm, THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PRocEss, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 481.
1962]
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formally allotted to the prosecutor, but the police exercise
it as well. A few illustrations from the American Bar Founda-
tion studies on the administration of criminal justice will
indicate the situation. The decision to arrest a prostitute
on a charge of accosting and soliciting must be based upon her
having accosted the officer (in most states). "If the officer
knows the accoster to be a common prostitute, he is likely
to decide in favor of making an arrest more quickly than if
the woman is unknown to him, appears to be of high social
status, and is intoxicated at the time."
Age is a major consideration in other cases. A man had
been accused of taking a small amount of ham from a store
without paying for it, though he maintained that the difficulty
arose out of confusion in making change. The lieutenant ques-
tioned him and found that he was 74 years old. He told the
officer to make a report on larceny from a store and get the
man's name and address. Turning to the accused, he stated,
"Be quiet, like a nice fellow. We are trying to send you home.
You are 74 years old-for crying out loud-we don't want to
lock you up for something like that- one dollar's worth of
boiled ham." He directed the man to go along with the officers
to make a report and he would then be released on promise to
return the following morning. Technically he had been ar-
rested, but the decision was already made not to go through
with the process except for some sort of warning.
In the special situation of extradition of non-support of-
fenders, the police may well operate with a seemingly inverted
standard of enforcement. In Detroit, after efforts have been
made under the Uniform Support Act to force an absent de-
fendant to support his family, if he seems content to remain in
jail and has demonstrated that in all probability he will con-
tinue to refuse to carry out his family duties, it is felt that the
expenditure of the taxpayer's money for extradition would
accomplish little. In this particular case there is joint police-
prosecutor discretion, rather than police discretion exclusively,
but it is still illustrative of the fact that the prosecutor is not
alone in exercising the authority not to invoke the process
based on a public-interest standard.
A final illustration is that of the agreement not to enforce
the narcotics laws against an offender in return for his serv-
ices as an informer. The informer-user may, in some cases,
[Vol. 14
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even be allowed to keep part of his "buy" for his trouble. Some
police chiefs contend that it is almost impossible to apprehend
dope peddlers without the cooperation of their addict cust-
omers."'
5) Personal prejudice or convenience. - Non-enforcement
may result from the personal prejudices of the officer or
even from a desire not to subject himself to undue incon-
venience. The Detroit study indicated that there is some
feeling in the department that it is beneath the dignity of an
officer to arrest for a crime normally handled by an officer
of lesser rank or inferior talent. For example, the 452 de-
tectives in the Detroit Police Department brought six of the
10,513 arrests for drunkenness in 1955. Detectives arrested
three of the 1,200 persons charged with driving while intox-
icated. To leave such arrests to the uniformed force has
certain practical values in not disclosing the identity of the
detectives and avoiding confusion in the mind of the offender,
but these factors alone do not seem to account for the virtual
non-enforcement by detectives of minor offenses.
A decision not to arrest may be dictated by the time the
officer is scheduled to go off duty. The officer also considers
the necessity of appearing in court the following day. In one
city, a vice bureau splits up days off, with half working
Saturday and half working Monday. Both groups are off on
Sunday. Thus official recognition seems to be accorded the
practice referred to in the popular tune "Never on Sunday."
Arrests are followed by an appearance in court on the follow-
ing day (Sunday excepted). As a consequence, officers work-
ing Saturday night will not make an arrest if they can avoid
it, since they will then have to appear in court on Monday
morning-their day off.
A different basis for selective enforcement may lie in the
police attitude toward certain classes or sub-groups in the
community. Cases of police brutality or harassment of Ne-
groes, for example, are well-known illustrations of this type
of unequal treatment. Another aspect of the problem, and
one not nearly so widely discussed, is failure to enforce certain
laws against members of one group while maintaining fairly
vigorous enforcement against all others. "This kind of unequal
11. See GOLDsTmN, supra, note 5 at 566, N. 42; also LAFAVE, THE POLICE
AND NONENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 179, 222-224.
1962]
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enforcement of law against Negroes resulted in such offenses
as bigamy and open and notorious co-habitation being over-
looked by law enforcement officials, and in arrests not being
made for carrying knives or for robbery of other Negroes."1 2
But it is in the area of felonious assault by a Negro upon
spouse or friend that the unequal treatment is most strikingly
illustrated. Many police apparently apply a double standard
in such crimes without question. The white offender is far
more likely to be arrested and prosecuted than the Negro. The
police are apt to explain that such folkways are an established
standard of behavior for Negroes and can't be changed. Two
other factors seem to be present as well: first, the victim
of felonious assault is less apt to pursue prosecution, and
second, the Negro press is apt to accuse the police of discrimi-
nation in some cities solely because more Negro arrests are
made than white.13 In a Detroit case, the police, receiving a
call for a disturbance, found a man bleeding from a knife
wound in the shoulder. His common-law wife was standing
over him and told the police that she had stabbed him with a
paring knife after an argument. The victim had come home
drunk and started attacking the wife with his hands and a
chair. She said that this routine had been going on for some
time and that she was tired of it. She had lost an eye as a
result of a similar attack several months earlier. She struck
him with the knife and he fell to the floor. He got up and
collapsed again. She then went to his aid and was consoling
him, telling him that she was sorry and that she loved him.
The victim was asked whether he wished to prosecute the
case. He said, "I want to see whether or not I live first."
He didn't, and the wife was then charged with murder. It was
clear, however, that unless the husband was willing to prose-
cute, nothing would have been done had he recovered. It
has been apparent in many cities that the only reason that
police are even called in by the victim of such assaults is so
that he can get free police ambulance transportation to the
hospital.
6) Non-enforcement on grounds that the law is merely an
expression of a moral obligation rather than an outright pro-
hibition. - Thurman Arnold has written:
Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy
12. LAFAVE, supra at 208.
13. Id., at 209.
[Vol. 14
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moral objections to established modes of conduct. They
are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct,
and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals.14
In 1961, in Poe v. Ullman,15 the United States Supreme
Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of Connecticut
criminal statutes prescribing penalties for the use of any
contraceptive device or for being an accessory to such a use.
Five of the court apparently felt that the fact that in the 75
years of the statutes' operation only one test case type of
prosecution had been brought indicated that there was no
danger of prosecution and therefore no justiciable controversy
was presented. Repeated attempts to change the law, twelve
since 1943, were unsuccesssful, but still there is no apparent
change in the policy of police or prosecutors to allow open
violations to go unchallenged.
Much consensual sexual misconduct is prohibited by stat-
ute.' 6 But there is little enforcement in this area unless the
conduct is substantial and notorious. On rare occasions, how-
ever, such laws have been invoked. For example, in Wisconsin
a few years ago a woman was charged and convicted of
fornication. According to one article, it appeared clearly that
the prosecution resulted primarily because she had agreed,
and then refused, to testify against her hoodlum boyfriend. 1'7
Arnold's statement would seem to fit the case of complete
non-enforcement, but doesn't really fit the situation of rare
enforcement. Repeal of the latter kind of law is often opposed
by the police on the ground that they like to have a full quiver
of arrows to employ against the really undesirable types in
the community against whom the ordinary criminal laws
have proven ineffective for lack of required proof or evidence.
Thus an Al Capone will be charged with income tax violation
while the ordinary citizen may only face the civil penalties
under the tax laws. It should be pointed out, too, that such
policies can be strongly conditioned by jury behavior. Juries
seem often to demand that the defendant in a tax fraud case
in effect be proved guilty of tax fraud plus other serious
crimes before they will return a guilty verdict.
14. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT, 160 (1935) in LAFAVE,
supra at 198.
15. 367 U. S. 497, 6 L.Ed. 2d 989 (1961).
16. See BENSING, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN SEX STATUTES,
42 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 57, 69; also LAFAVE, supra at 199.
17. REMINGTON and ROSENBLUM, supra, Note 10, at 493-494.
1962] 481
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The conclusion seems to be clear that the police do in fact
exercise a vast amount of discretion not to invoke the criminal
process--some dictated by budget limitations and much more
based on a variety of other arguments. Having pointed out
some of the areas in which the police do have discretion not
to enforce, the next question is, to what extent is such dis-
cretion desirable in the system?
Desirability of Police Discretion to Enforce Selectively
Professor Joseph Goldstein, of the Yale Law School, states
flatly that, "The ultimate answer is that the police should not
be delegated discretion not to invoke the criminal law."' 8 He
admits that there will be borderline cases and also that budget
problems will impose limitations on full enforcement of all
criminal laws. But he urges that proper re-writing of the
laws to reduce ambiguity and to repeal "obsolete" laws, and
the establishment of a Policy Appraisal and Review Board
to advise the police on enforcement policies until the new codes
can be enacted, will solve most of the discretion problem.
It does not appear either that the legislature can be explicit
and non-ambiguous in setting out a criminal code represent-
ative of the community's will or that it will respond with
sufficient rapidity to the shifts in public opinion with respect
to what that code should contain. If the community will
annot be accurately reflected in the code, then enforcement
n accordance with that will demands that discretion be lodged
Somewhere in the system. One argument is that it should be
in the prosecutor, who is by law given such authority. This
program demands that the police arrest all violators and feed
them into the process, while the prosecutor is given the sole
authority to select out those cases which he does not wish
to push on to formal trial. This proposal, however, does not
properly take into account the degree to which arrest itself
is punishment. In fact, the entire process can be viewed as
a series of stages, each of which subjects the accused to suc-
cessively greater penalty or degradation, called by one writer
"status degradation ceremonies."'19 The administration of
18. GOLDSTEIN, supra, note 5 at 586. In fairness, it must be pointed out
that the bald statement of conclusion here does not do justice to Professor
Goldstein's excellent documentation and analysis leading up to it. None-
theless, it is his conclusion.
19. GARFINKEL, CONDITIONS OF SuccEsSFuL DEGRADATION CEREMONIES,
61 AM. T. SOCIOLOGY 420 (1956).
[Vol. 14482
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criminal justice is not simply a matter of separating the
guilty from the innocent, at least in terms of the consequences.
As far as the community views the matter, arrest itself is
punishment, even though the accused never be brought to
trial. Even a police reprimand, as in the case of the patrol
car visit to the home to request that a noisy party be toned
down, is often damaging to the subject's pride and reputation.
It would apear to be desirable that the police have the milder
weapons of warning and reprimand at their disposal rather
than require them to treat every infraction alike and force
each violator through the process as far as the prosecutor's
desk.
It seems, then, that both because of the inadequacies inher-
ent in a criminal code and the nature of the consequences of
criminal law administration the police must be accorded some
degree of discretion not to invoke the process or to invoke it
selectively. The regulatory commissions have discretion of
this sort as do other administrators in the Internal Revenue
Service or the Department of Agriculture. They, too, have
sub-legislative functions which are in all probability unavoid-
able in most of the administrative process. The scope of
judicial review of much, if not most, of this area of discretion
is severely restricted, both by statute and by judicial accept-
ance of the necessity for such authority. Yet it is doubtful
if public opinion is nearly as effective in controlling the policy
of the regulatory commission as it is in determining the
exercise of discretion by the police. In the matter of reflection
of community will, then, a strong case might be made that
the police are more directly responsive to democratic controls
than many other administrators with broad discretionary po-
wers. If one takes the view that the criminal law is to be
enforced to the letter at the police level, let the chips fall
where they will, then this argument is irrelevant. If, however,
one feels that some flexibility in applying the law is necessary
even at the invocation stage and that public opinion should
play a substantial part in determining which sections of the
code should be enforced and to what extent, then the respon-
siveness of the persons to whom discretion is to be given be-
comes a matter of importance. Regular but informal com-
munication between the police and certain of the elected local
policy officials could better serve this political function than
1962]
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a formal Review Board made up predominately of officials
at the state level, as suggested by Professor Goldstein.
What sort of non-enforcement or selective enforcement is
undesirable? Basically, decisions not to enforce which are
based on personal convenience or prejudice are those which
should be condemned. It is in this area that the best case
can be made that discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capri-
ciously. If drunk drivers are arrested on Thursday but not
on Friday merely because the Friday officers would lose
part of their day off appearing in court, then the decision not
to arrest is improper. It is this type of non-enforcement or
selective enforcement which appears to raise a serious ques-
tion of equal protection. Enforcement of felonious assault
laws against whites but not against Negroes, where the victim
is also a Negro, because of the prejudice that "that's the way
those people settle their arguments" is in the same category.
The knife of racial discrimination can cut both ways, and both
types are improper.
This leads to the third question of what kinds of controls
can be used to reduce police non-enforcement grounded on
mere convenience or prejudice.
Controls on Improper Police Discretion
One of the most formidable and useful controls over police
discretion not to enforce is public opinion. This may take the
form of telephone calls to the police chief, letters to the edi-
tors of newspapers, or contacts with the mayor or council,
who in turn call in the police for explanations and discussion.
Thus consistent non-enforcement in the face of public opinion
which demands enforcement normally can be expected to
lead to strong political pressures to change the policy. Con-
versely, enforcement in opposition to public opinion will
arouse strong objection. Selective non-enforcement may take
longer to register public disapproval, but if the basis for
selection runs counter to the public sentiment, then this too
will engender a reaction. Police training schools in some
areas, at least, and perhaps in all, stress to the rookie police-
man that he must constantly keep in mind what the public
demands in terms of enforcement policy. The police chief 'in
one of the larger South Carolina cities told such a group-that
one of the key factors determining the success of a "police.
[Vol. 14
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officer is his ability to guage the desires of the public in
criminal law enforcement.
A second control which is becoming increasingly important
is in the professionalization of the police function. Police
training programs and in-service schooling and conferences
are increasing both in number and in the range of the sub-
ject matter involved. With increasing frequency, higher ad-
ministrative positions in police forces are being filled on a
competitive basis, with applicants from out-of-city police
forces often winning the positions. The combination of more
intensive and extensive training plus the desire to build a
reputation for efficient and intelligent enforcement which will
carry outside the immediate community promises to be a
strong barrier against irresponsible use of the discretion
lodged in the police officer.
Finally, there are possibilities for judicial controls which
are now latent, but which could usefully be brought to bear
on the problem. At the present time the state courts are very
reluctant to dismiss prosecutions or to enjoin prosecutions in
response to claims that others in similar circumstances were
not proceeded against. Some courts have at least been willing
to consider such arguments but have stated that only classifi-
cations based upon "race, religion, color or the like" would
violate the equal protection guarantee.20 In other cases it
has been required that the defendant show that he would be
in a better position if the others were also subject to prose-
cution.21 This would be the case, for example, where Blue
Laws were not equally enforced. Finally, the defendant must
by proper proof overcome the presumption that the police have
acted in a regular and proper manner and show that discrim-
inatory enforcement was intentional rather than accidental.22
One writer states that control of police discretion by resort to
the equal protection clause "seems likely to remain more a
matter of theory than of practical relief ... unless the courts
exercise more flexibility in judging attempts to prove dis-
20. State v. Jourdain, 225 La. 1030, 74 So. 2d 203 (1954). See also
People v. Oreek, 74 Cal. App. 2d 215, 168 P. 2d 186 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946),
where this* was the court's approach to the allegation by a bookie that
other forms of gambling were not proceeded against.
21. People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P. 2d 118 (Dist. Ct. App.
1943).
22. People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d oSupp. 876, 882, 342 P 2d 538,
543 (Super. Ct. 1959).
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criminatory enforcement." 23 It would surely seem possible
for the courts to relax somewhat the present rigid require-
ments of proof under the equal protection claim in order to
offer some protection against selective enforcement based on
arbitrary or capricious classifications. Under such an ap-
proach considerable pressure could be brought to bear toward
uniform enforcement policies. A white defendant in a bigamy
case, for example, would have a strong chance of getting a
dismissal by showing that persons of other races were con-
sistently allowed to violate the statute with impunity.
In other situations as well, such an attack might prove ef-
fective in controlling improper selective enforcement. The
speed trap towns may present a situation where police and
local public opinion agree on a policy of supporting govern-
mental functions by means of enforced contributions from
out of town motorists. Such a classification of customers is
arbitrary and unreasonable, and the admission of the equal
protection argument in support of dismissal should be a use-
ful means of attaining more uniform treatment of offenders.
The door need not be opened so wide that the equal protection
argument becomes the standard defense and undermines the
enforcement process completely. It needs only to be estab-
lished as a weapon against flagrant violations of fair judg-
ment in policies of selective enforcement.
The conclusion here is that all these controls would work
more effectively if the facts of police discretion were recog-
nized openly rather than being hidden beneath the myth of a
mandate of full enforcement. It appears that police and policy
makers are largely foreclosed from intelligent discussion and
analysis of law enforcement policies by the ever-present,
though false, assumption of a requirement of full enforcement.
In other words, it might be both appropriate and useful for
the police chief and the city council to sit down and ask each
other, "What laws should we enforce this week?"
Taken singly, the controls discussed here do not perhaps
sound very imposing. Operating jointly, however, and com-
plementing each other, there is evidence that they can present
substantial protections against some of the more undesirable
kinds of non-enforcement or selective enforcement.
23. Comment, 61 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1103, 1141 (1961).
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